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STATE CONTROL OF SEDITION: THE SMITH ACT
AS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND
ALAN "REEVE HUNT*

I
Steve Nelson, an admitted Communist Party leader in western
Pennsylvania, was indicted by an Allegheny County grand jury
on October 17, 1950.1 The indictment contained twelve counts
charging separate violations of the Pennsylvania statute which defines the crime of sedition and makes it a felony.2 At the close of
Nelson's trial a jury found him guilty as charged on all counts.3
The defense filed motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.
The Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County in a written
4
decision demed these motions and sustained the verdict of the jury.
It sentenced Nelson to the maximum penalties prescribed by the
*Member of Pennsylvania and District of Columbia Bars; J.D., Micigan, 1954; L.L.M., Harvard, 1955.
1. Transcript of Record, VoL I, pp. 9-20 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956). The N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1956, § E, p. 2, col 6, carried the
following brief biography:
"Stephen Mesaro[s]h -(better known as Steve Nelson) came to the
United States in 1921 from Yugoslavia. A Communist of long standing,
he made his 'pilgrimage' to Moscow in 1931 and later served with the
Loyalist forces in Spar's Civil War. Upon his return to the United
States, he became a party organizer in Califormia and eventually was
named leader of the Western Pennsylvania Communist Party."
For some time prior to his indictment Nelson operated openly from the
Communist Party headquarters in Pittsburgh, and at his trial no attempt
x-as made to deny his membership or position of leadership m the party.
Nelson was also indicted and convicted in federal court under the Smith
Act. United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd,
223 F2d 449 (3d Cir. 1955), but the Supreme Court vacated this judgment
per curam with instructions to grant a new trial. 77 Sup. Ct. 8 (Oct. 10,
1956). Chief Justice Warren subsequently wrote an opmion stating the
reasons for the Court's order. 77 Sup. Ct. 1 (Nov. 5,1936). Certiorari had
been granted, 350 U.S. 922 (1955), but these proceedings originated in a
motion by the Solicitor General on September 27, 1956, seeking a remand
of the case to the district court for a hearing as to the truthfulness of an
important government witness at the trial. Reason to doubt the credibility
of this witness had arisen since that time. A majority of the Court, over the
dissents of Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Burton, 77 Sup. Ct. 8 (Nov. 5,
1956), concluded that the interests of justice would be better served by a new
trial than by the remand the federal government had requested. The retrial
thus decreed for Nelson and others convicted of Smith Act violations has
been scheduled for January 7, 1957, in the District Court for the Vestern
District of Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh). Legal Intell. (Philadelphia), Nov.
28, 1956, p. 1,col. 3.
2. This was the Pennsylvania Sedition Act of 1919, later codified as
Section 207 of the Pennsylvania Penal Code of 1939, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18,
§ 4207 (Prdon 1945).
3. Transcript of Record, Vol. I, p. 22, Pennsylvania v. Nelson. 350
U.S. 497 (1956). The original trial of Nelson and others had been continued
as to Nelson owing to his involvement in a serious automobile accident.
4. Id. at 28-49.
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Pennsylvania law, ten thousand dollars fine, and twenty years miprisonment. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the judgment of sentence per curiam and
adopted the opinion of the trial court.5 A further appeal to the Suipreme Court of Pennsylvania resulted in a reversal, one judge dissenting, and an order that Nelson's indictment be dismissed., The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's petition for a reargument was
refused.' Upon application by the Commonwealth to the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, that Court agreed
to hear the case.8 On April 2, 1956, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a 6-3 decision, affirmed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.9 Petitions for a rehearing were demed."
This sequence of events provided the framework for a series
of searching judicial inquiries into the allocation between state and
nation of the power and responsibility for the prosecution and punishment of sedition. The ultimate judicial answer to these inquiries
was delivered in favor of the federal government, which was a reluctant recipient of this bounty 1" The Supreme Court's decision
thus crossed the politically sensitive question of sedition with the
politically charged issue of states' rights, and not surprisingly produced a widely-publicized political controversy 12 Those legislators
and other political leaders who have been out of sympathy with the
Supreme Court since its decision in the school segregation cases'
seized upon the decision in Nelson as fresh evidence of the Court's
willingness to intrude into forbidden areas. 1 4 From a legal stand5. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A.2d 431 (1952).
6. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954)
7 377 Pa. 58, 60, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
8. 348 U.S. 814 (1954)
9. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
10. 351 U.S. 934 (1956).
11. In the brief for United States as anicus curiae the Solicitor General took the position that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision should
be reversed.
12. The decision was described as "very bad" by Representative Howard
W Smith, of Virginia, author of the Smith Act. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1956,
p. 16, col. 6. See also public statement by Smith and other Congressmen
who had voted for the bill. Ibid. Former Supreme Court Justice, James F
Byrnes, severely criticized the decision in an article appearing in U.S. News
and World Report, May 18, 1956, p. 50, reported also in N.Y. Times, May
15, 1956, p. 1, col. 3.
13. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

14. Criticism of the Nelson case was coupled with renewed attacks oi

the segregation decision. See Byrnes, op. cit. supra note 12, interpreting
both as a judicial usurpation of state powers, and Krock, Supreme Court

Faces New Attack on Power, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1956, § E, p. 3, col. 1-2.
But see the defense of the Court's decisions in these cases by Representative
Celler of New York in a letter to the N.Y. Times, June 17, 1956, § E, p.8,
,col. 6, and the statement of more than one hundred leading lawyers from
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point, the decision created serious doubt as to the validity of the
sedition laws of forty-four states and of Alaska and Hawaii,5 and
it required the dismissal or reversal of indictments or convictions
0
which had been obtained under several of these same statutes.
The number of briefs filed as amic curiae during all stages of the
Supreme Court proceedings is an indication of the intense interest
in the final decision shared by parties having a wide variety of reasons for their concern.. 7 This interest and attention has now shifted
to Congress, where legislation to reverse the result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision was introduced even before the
United States Supreme Court had affirmed.18 It is expected that
similar bills intended to overturn both rulings and to vest or conthirty-one states and territories expressing grave concern over the "current
wave of abuse" directed against the Court which was "doubtless precipitated
by the school segregation decisions, though it has by no means been limited
to them." N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1956, p. 63, coL 1-8.
15. Fund for the Republic, Digest of the Public Record of Communism
in the United States, at 266-306 (1955), indicates that as of January, 1955,
forty-four states had statutes which might be variously described as" prohibiting sedition, criminal syndicalism, and crimnal anarchy. See also Gellhorn, The States and Subversion (1952), and Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 327
(1952). These laws proscribe acts in terms sufficiently similar to the Pennsylvania law's definition of "sedition" so that the Ne.ron, decision would
probably control their validity. The present legal status of other and related
state laws, for example those requiring the registration of Communists or
making Communist Party membership unlawful is not so clear. See Albertson
v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952), upholding registration provisions of the Michigan Communist Control Law against the contention that
the Internal Security Act of 1950 had occupied the field. The Supreme Court
reversed on other grounds, 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
16. Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 134 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 1956), Braden v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956). A Massachusetts grand jury
has also dropped long standing charges against Professor Dirk J.Struik of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 6, col. 3.
17. In support of the petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, briefs of amici curiae were filed by the following:
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of Texas, State of Illinois, and State
of New Hampshire, the latter joined by the Attorneys General of twentyfour other states, including Massachusetts.
Subsequent to the grant of the writ by the Supreme Court on October
14, 1954, 348 U.S. 814, additional briefs amici were submitted by the following" United States, by its Solicitor General, American Civil Liberties Union,
American Legion, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Civil Liberties Committee of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends,
and Frank J. Donner, attorney for individual amici curiae, all of whom had
either been indicted or subjected to interrogation under the sedition laws of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Kentucky, and Florida.
After the Supreme Court's decision on April 2, 1956, 350 U.S. 497, a
petition for rehearing was filed by the District Attorney of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, and Albert A. Fiok, an attorney of record appearing
on the main brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This petition was
joined by the Attorneys General of thirty-four states and the territory of
Alaska. A separate petition for rehearing was submitted by the Attorney
General of the State of New York.
18. H.R. 8211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), introduced by Representative Howard Wr. Smith on March 3, 1954. 100 Cong. Rec. 2614 (1954)
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firm in the states greater power with respect to sedition and subversive activities will be placed1 before the 85th Congress. "'
If enacted into law, these bills may well have a more profound effect upon our federal system than the decisions which occasioned
their introduction.
The primary purpose of this article is to examine the issues and
precedents involved in the Supreme Court's consideration of the
Nelson case, and on this basis to make an appraisal of the Court's
decision. Secondary purposes include an estimate of the presently
permissible limits of state control over seditious activity, and an
account of the continuing congressional response which the Nelson
decision evoked. Consideration of the last named will probably not
be in proportion to its importance for the reason that the final product of this legislative aftermath has yet to emerge.
II
At the outset it may be well to suggest a frame of reference into
which the decision in the Nelson case may be placed. While judicial
resolutions of supersedure questions in the general area of sedition
and subversive activity have not been numerous, 2 the Supreme
Court has been interpreting the meaning of the Constitution and
the intent of Congress as they bear upon the distribution of power
between state and nation virtually since the adoption of the Constitution. The commerce clause has provided the most frequent occa21
sion for these determinations.
19. The Committee Hearings disclosed relatively little opposition to
H.R. 3 and S. 3617 as finally reported. See p. 329, infra.
20. The principal Supreme Court decisions which have considered federal supersedure in areas related to sedition and national security are the
following- Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (registration of aliens),
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (recruiting for the United States
armed forces) , Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (state law prohibiting commercial use of United States Flag) , Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886) (law creating state militia and regulating military organizations).
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820) (service in the federal
militia) The leading state cases decided prior to the Supreme Court decision in Nelson are Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954)
(state investigation of subversive activities) , People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23,
136 N.E. 505 (1922) (sedition law) , State v. Tachm, 92 N.J.L. 269, 106 Ati.
145 (1919) (sedition law), and State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W. 181
(1918) (recruiting for the United States armed forces) See also Kahn v.
Wyman, 123 A.2d 166 (N.H. 1956) (legislative investigation of subversive
activities).
21. See Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. CIu. L. Rev. 27,
40 (1942), Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 262 (1946), Hunt, Federal Supreniacy
and State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 407 (1955) (discusses commerce and labor relations cases). Portions of that article, which
inspired the instant article, have necessarily been duplicated and expanded
upon in this article.
The commerce clause cases which appear to have been considered particularly useful by the several courts involved and parties interested in the
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The Constitution itself makes many fundamental allocations of
authority within the federal system. Thus it is well-settled that in
certain areas federal power is exclusive, and that in these areas
the states are foreclosed from action even though Congress has not
exercised its power and has not said that it wishes the matter left
untouched by legislation. 2 These conclusions respecting exclusive
federal power are thus reached by interpreting the text of the Constitution, not by divining congressional intent. Actual and outright
conflict between federal and state laws relating to identical subject
matter, moreover, can commonly be resolved by resort to Article
'VI, section 2, of the Constitution, generally referred to as the supremacy clause.2 3 The clear dictate of this clause is that in such a
case, the offending state law must fall. Of course, the supremacy
of federal power there articulated is implicit in many judicial displacements of state power, even where the contrary nature of state
legislation is not so apparent. Finally, while it may be true that the
tenth amendment does little more than express an inference which
would be drawn in any event from the limited nature of federal
power, it is dear that the states possess an important residuum of
reserved powers. Here judicial readiness to strike down state legislation must be carefully tempered by regard for the states' rights
to police their own affairs. 4 Supersedure in such a case must genNelson case are Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953)
(Labor Management Relations Act); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725
(1949); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (Wagner Act), Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United
Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942) (Wagner Act); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148
(1942).
27 Again the leading decisions arose under the commerce clause.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824) (principle implied), Brown
v. -Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419 (1827) (principle followed).
23. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thig in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
24. In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937), Chief Justice
Hughes said:
"... The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the
State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by
federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so
'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently
stand together."
To similar effect are statements in Schwartz v. Texas. 344 U.S. 199, 202-03
(1952); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943), AllenBradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942) ; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148
(1902). The leading early decision, from which Justice Hughes was quoting
in the Kelly case, is Sinnott v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243
(1859).
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erally be grounded upon positive interference with federal purposes.
While the Constitution thus furnishes the broad outlines in
accordance with which power is to be distributed, Congress may
make its own choices within this framework, and may alter the
framework itself in fundamental respects. Thus Congress may authorize state action even in areas of otherwise exclusive federal concern ;5 it may permit or deny to the states power to legislate in
areas upon which neither has constitutional claims ;20 and at least
where it has sufficient interest in so doing, it may drastically limit
the reach of state power in areas of normally unquestioned state
competence. 7 It is only when Congress has failed to speak clearly,
and where the Constitution itself does not help, that courts have
been obliged to work out an often conflicting and frequently unsatisfactory set of rules under which some answer as to congressional intent can be given. The matter of federal supersession becomes clearer, to some extent at least, if we regard these latter rules
as the true "pre-emption doctrines" and if we realize that they are
guides to the discovery of congressional intent which apply properly only in situations where neither Constitution nor Congress has
expressly pointed the way A frequent and troublesome initial ques25. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936),

In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.

545 (1891).
26. Statutes embodying express authorization or denial of state power
are not likely to require clarifying interpretation. Litigation is typically pro-

duced by the question whether a congressional direction exists. Where it
does, courts generally give it full effect. A recent example is Railway Employes' Department, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), involving § 2.
Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 152 (1952), which expressly authorized "union shop" agreements
notwithstanding the provisions of any state law. Suit was brought to enjoin
the enforcement of such an agreement on the ground, iter alia, that it violated provisions of the Nebraska Constitution and implementing legislation
prohibiting the union shop. The Supreme Court, recognizing the power of
states to enact "right to work" laws in the absence of conflicting federal
legislation, nevertheless had no difficulty in declaring simply that a uion
agreement made pursuant to the federal law "by force of the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made illegal nor
vitiated by any provisions of the laws of a State." 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956)
The Court noted that "the parallel provision in § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartlev
Act
makes the union shop agreement give way before a state law prohibiting it." Ibid, n. 5. See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218,
234-36 (1947), and the examples of express consent by Congress to share its
powers with the states given in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 753-54
(1949) (dissenting opinion)
Adversaries in pre-emption cases can and do draw opposing inferences
from the relative ease with which Congress can permit or prohibit concurrent state power. Had it been the congressional intent to allow (or forbid),
runs the argument, Congress well knew an effective way of doing so.
27 A recent instance is Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)
holding that the Immunity Act of 1954 prohibits all state prosecutions based
upon testimony compelled under the federal law and that Congress has the
power to impose this drastic limitation upon state proceedings.
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tion in the application of pre-emption doctrines is whether they
should be used at all. On this analysis it may be understood why so
many supersedure cases turn upon the multiple bases of Constitution, express congressional intent, and what we have called true
pre-emption doctrin&s. In a single decision judges may believe that
the case presents a question of exclusive federal power or state
police power, of clear conflict between the provisions of the statutes
concerned, of demonstrable congressional intent as disclosed in
statute or legislative history, or finally of presumed congressional
intent as determined under pre-emption rules. As justice Black
observed in Hines v. Davzdowitz"
"There is not-and from the very nature of the problem
there cannot be--any rigid formula or rule which can be used
as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose
of every act of Congress. This Court, ,m considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions:
conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation, curtailment;
and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula."28
The following is offered as a summary of the grounds upon
which the Supreme Court has commonly discharged its duty to
choose between the competing claims of state and federal government when these cannot be resolved by reference to some clear
constitutional or congressional mandate.
(1) Congressional Action in an Area of Supreme Federal
Power and Interest. Where federal legislation exists in an area of
supreme, though not exclusive, federal interest, the Supreme Court
has frequently been willing to displace state power on relatively
slender evidence of congressional intent to preclude the states.20
Nor has the existence of an actual conflict or repugnancy between
state and federal law in such a case been required. Correspondingly,
where the national interest is thought to be less dominant, courts
have required a stronger inference or indication of congressional
intent to dislodge state power. And in areas of long-recognized state
interest, courts are inclined to assume that Congress wished to leave
28. 312 U.S.52, 67 (1941).

29. The Supreme Court has since viewed its decision in Hines v,.
Davidowitz as employing a presumption of congressional intent to pre-empt
in areas of paramount national concern. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

331 U.S. 218,230 (1947).
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the states free to act." There are, of course, no agreed-upon rules
to be followed in weighing these interests, but the balance struck
may be fundamental since it often dictates the further choice of the
inferences or the evidences of intent which are to control the case.
No judge, for example, could hand down a well-reasoned decision
respecting state control over seditious activity without first making
some assumptions as to the relative weights of state and national
interests in suppressing such activity
(2) Interference unth or Obstruction of Congressional Purposes. This is an important variant of the direct conflict or repugnancy test. While it retains an important element of the "conflict"
idea, it does not depend upon the relatively objective textual comparisons of state and federal statutes which a strict repugnancy test
involves. Rather it inquires more broadly into congressional purposes, and looks to see if the state law gives promise of thwarting
these objectives. 31 It has, for example, been said that the additional
penalties provided by a state law run contrary to the congressional
purpose manifested in providing a single set of penalties." This
may be asserted even though the acts obviously do not collide in the
sense that to comply with one is to disobey the other. Or again it
may be argued that when a federal law contains certain deliberate
safeguards for the protection of individual liberty which the state
act omits, the effect of the congressional safeguards would be nullified if the state were allowed to proceed.-3 Congress, the argument
would conclude, could not have intended such a result.
(3) Occupatwn of the Field. A strain of doctrine running
strongly through a great many Supreme Court decisions involving
the regulation of commerce and labor-management relations is the
notion that where Congress has enacted a comprehensive body of
legislation which pervades the field it is legitimate to infer that there
30. See note 24 supra.

31. Thus it was stated in Hines v. Davidowitz that.

"Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances
of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
32. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 738, 752 (1949) (dissenting opinions) , Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105 (1943) , Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 25 (1820). Despite the probable permissibility
of double punishment from a constitutional standpoint, there are heavy overtones here of due process thinking stemming from the obvious harshness of
dual or multiple sets of penalties.
33. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) , Albertson v. Millard,
106 F Supp. 635, 650 (D.Mich. 1952) (dissenting opinion)
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is no room left for the states.34 This reasoning is equally applicable
either to federal laws or federal administrative regulation. For example, it has been applied where state law coincides with rules of
the National Labor Relations Board.35 This regulatory agency now
ranges so widely over our economy that the field can in many instances very properly be described as federally occupied. And to
recall another and closely related doctrine, the potential for conflict
between federal and state objectives is closely correlated with the
degree to which federal power embraces a field. Application of the
doctrine frequently involves an initial problem of defining the field
which is said to be occupied.
(4) Double Punishment and Dual Sovereignty. Double punishment should not be confused with double jeopardy. The latter is
a constitutional limitation set forth in the fifth amendment which
inhibits the federal government from placing persons twice in jeopardy for the same offense.38 It has been contended, as it was in
the Nelson case, that double jeopardy in its constitutional sense
is a reason for disallowing state action respecting sedition. The argument is that if the state were to prosecute first, the plea of prior
jeopardy could then be urged in bar of a subsequent federal prosecution, and state action would thus frustrate the exercise of fed.eral power. Precedents lend little support to the argument. First,
the federal government is probably not estopped by prior state prosecution, even for the same offense.3 s Second, it is now well settled
that state and federal governments may properly penalize the same
acts when these constitute separate offenses against their respective
34. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Service
Conm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919) ; and McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115

(1913).
35. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S.
767 (1947).
36. U.S. Const. amend. V:
.
nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; .
37. Brief for Respondent, pp. 49-52, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956). The argument was not that the instant prosecution subjected

Nelson to double jeopardy, since the Pennsylvania indictment preceded the
federal prosecution under the Smith Act. See note 1 sutpra. Respondent's
contention was rather that a plea of double jeopardy might bar the subsequent federal proceeding, and thus inhibit operation of the Smith Act. A
motion by Nelson to dismiss the federal indictment on this ground, however,

was rejected, 13 F.R.D. 180, 186 (W.D. Pa. 1952), and the point was not
further considered by the federal courts.
38. This follows from the fact that the fifth amendment to the Constitution is a restriction upon the federal government alone. Barron v. Baltimore.
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1843). The double jeopardy provision has accordingly
been interpreted as aDplyinz only to a second federal prosecution. United

States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
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sovereignties."' These latter decisions, however, would not appear
to rule out the objection that separate offenses are not involved
when a state punishes criminal acts directed against the federal
government. The only way this contention can be resolved is by
answering further questions about the respective interests of the
governments concerned. Against which one or more of the sovereigns involved were the offending acts really committed?
The argument based on double punishment can accept and ignore the fact that under the Constitution, state and nation may enjoy concurrent rights to punish offenders. For this is essentially
pre-emption doctrine again-another way of discovering congressional intent by inference. The possibility of double punishment for
the same acts can raise several such inferences. First, it can be
said that Congress would not wish further and perhaps more stringent penalties to be imposed in addition to the ones it has already
prescribed. Second, state prosecutions may obstruct congressional
purposes by interfering in various practical ways with federal proceedings. Finally, double punishment has such an element of unfairness that Congress should not be presumed to have intended
such a result. As Justice Washington early pointed out in Houston
v. Moore, it is "something very much like oppression, if not
0
worse."1
(5) Imputed Congressional Intent. Included here is the almost
boundless range of arguments addressed to what Congress "knew"
when it was legislating. Such arguments generally cut both ways.
Thus it has been stated in decisions dealing with sedition that Congress knew of the existence of a great many state laws concerned
with the same problem. 41 The legislative history of the Smith and
Internal Security Acts bears this out.42 But what is the inference?
39. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943), Westfall v. United
States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927), Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926)
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254
U.S. 325 (1920), Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852) , United
States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850) , Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 410 (1847)
40. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1820)
41. Justice Bell, dissenting in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58,
84-85, 104 A.2d 133, 146 (1954). Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 79
(1941) (dissenting opinion), where Justice Stone made the same point with
respect to state alien registration acts.
42. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on
the Judicary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, at 7,69,83-85 (1939). There are
numerous references here to state laws, and the Smith Act was largely patterned on the Criminal Anarchy Act of New York which had been upheld
in Gitlow v. New York. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Congress continued its awareness of the state laws, and at least one of its committees would appear to
have approved of them. Annual Report of the Committee on Un-American
4ctivities for the Year 1949, H.R. Rep. 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sei,. 25-46
(1950), and H.R. Rep. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950)
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That had Congress wished these state laws to fall it would have
said so? Or that had Congress wished the state law to stand it would
have said so? Again it has been said that Congress was aware of
the federal government's inadequacies in combatting internal subversion. 4 3 Assuming that Congress did in fact believe that federal
efforts in this direction had been unsatisfactory, was the inadequacy to be remedied by more federal legislation, or by giving the states
free rein? What is the effect to be given congressional declarations
as to the international scope and nature of the Communist conspiracy ?4 It has been argued, in dissent, that these statements evidence
a congressional design to treat the problem as one of nationwide
45
concern to the exclusion of the states.
(6) Belief as to Unwisdom or Unconslitutionality of State
Laws. Any honest analysis of the decisions must take into account
the fact that federal supersedure is a likelier result where a court
disapproves of state laws on other grounds.4 0 Some judges have
been willing to disclose this disapproval and their reasons for it.
Others may be less candid, though perhaps it is not unfair to say
that on occasion a judge is really expressing his own doubts respecting such laws when he attributes them to Congress.'A few further observations with special reference to the preemption issues raised by sedition laws may be offered. From a constitutional standpoint, despite the express duty laid upon Congress
43. Justice Bell, dissenting in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58,
87, 104 A.2d 133, 147 (1954). Justice Bell went even further, stating that
Congress knew that the federal government needed the active cooperation
of th states, as well as the "enthusiastic help of every patriotic American
citizen." This view is difficult to reconcile with facts such as those stated in
note 107 infra.
44. In the Internal Security Act, 64 Stat 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781
(1952)', Congress found that: "There exists a -world Communist movement
wich, in its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a worldwide revolutionary movement.
!' Findings of a similar nature are contained in the Communist Control Act, 68 Stat 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841
(Supp. III, 1956).
45. Albertson v. Millard, 106 F Supp. 635, 648 (D.Mich. 1952) (dissenting opinion).

46. There can be little doubt as to the attitude of the judges toward the
state laws involved in Hines v. Davidowitz and Commonwealth v. Nelson.

See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Gilbert v. Minnesota,
254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920), and the dissent in Albertson v. Millard, 106 F.
Supp. 635, 647-53 (D.Mich. 1952). The dissenting judges in the latter two
cases did not believe that the state laws in question met the due process
standards prescribed by the fourteenth amendment. In the commerce field,
see Southern Pac. Ry. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
47. Cf. Powell, Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and
State Police Power, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 28, 48 (1922)
"Seldom does Congress explicitly negative the further application of State laws.
While this
issue is referred to the intention of Congress, it is apparent that as a rule it
."
intending.
the
doing
is
that
is the court
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to provide for the common defense,'s there is relatively little tendency to decide supersedure questions on the basis that federal power
over sedition and subversion is exclusive, in the sense that it has
been allotted by the Constitution to Congress unless and until the
latter expressly elects to share it."0 There is, however, an additional
provision of the Constitution to which reference has seemed appropriate where sedition laws are involved. This is Article IV,
section 4, which states that
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion, and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence."
Congressional authority to enact anti-subversive legislation has
been expressly grounded upon this clause.50 And it has been urged
that the section goes far in establishing the predominant interest
and responsibility of the federal government in guarding against the
dangers of forcible overthrow or violent change. 51 An inference
looking toward the opposite conclusion has been drawn from the
same section. The congressional duty, it is contended, extends to
the protection of the states against invasion from without.12 Whatever duties it may have respecting domestic violence are limited by
the requirement that the state must actively solicit federal assistance. 53 Finally, state and federal laws directed against seditious and
subversive activity inevitably raise important civil liberties questions
48. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl, 1.
49. The proposition that the Constitution itself places sedition against

the United States beyond the power of the states to punish unless Congress
affirmatively permits it was unsuccessfully advanced by the respondent before

the Supreme Court in the Nelson case. Brief for Respondent, p. 22 ct. seq.,

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) This position, however reasonable as a matter of policy, enjoys scant support in the decided cases. Even in
Hines v. Davidowitz, affirming the supremacy of federal
vower
in the regulation of aliens, the Supreme Court did not categorize this power as exclusive, despite its intimate relation to the exclusive federal power over foreign
affairs.
50. Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952)
wherein it is stated that. "The Communist organization ii the United
States
and the nature and control of the world Communist movement
itself
make it necessary that Congress, in order to provide for the
common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an
independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican form of
"
government, enact appropriate legislation.
51. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58. 69, 104 A.2d 133, 139
(1954)
52. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 30-31, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956)
53. It was suggested, in answer to this argument, that the states
initiative under the constitutional provision is restricted to cases of actual
domestic violence, not seditious utterance. Brief of Frank J. Donner, aq
Amicus Curiae, p. 49, Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)
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which seldom intrude so forcibly in other areas. As Justice Black
noted for the Court in Hines v. Davidowilz, ".
it is also of importance that this legislation deals with the rights, liberties, and
personal freedoms of human beings, and is in an entirely different
category from state tax statutes or state pure food laws regulating
the labels on cans."' 4 The presence of these questions may have an
important effect upon a court's approach to a pre-emption question,
its reasoning, and its ultimate conclusion.
III
To return now to the Nelson case, the initial contention that federal legislation had ousted the states of jurisdiction to prosecute
seditious activity was advanced by the defendant Nelson in a motion to quash his indictment. 55 He pursued the argument again in
connection with motions requesting the Court of Quarter Sessions
to arrest judgment and to grant a new trial. These latter motions
provided the occasion for the first judicial resolution of the preemption issue raised by Pennsylvania's statute. Nelson urged that
the Smith Act and the McCarran Act taken together impliedly
superseded state legislation directed against sedition. Judge Montgomery wrote an opinion for the trial court in which he rejected
this and other of the defendant's grounds for objection to the Penn.sylvania law. With respect to pre-emption, Judge Montgomery conceded that in some areas the Constitution grants exclusive powers
to the federal government, and that in other areas federal jurisdiction is supreme, with the result that the states may not act when
the federal government expressly or by necessary implication has
evidenced its intent that state power shall be superseded. No such
intent, expressed or implied, was considered to inhere in either the
Smith or the McCarran Acts. In fact, Judge Montgomery found
in the latter statute an expression of intent that state power was
not to be displaced. 5 Finally, he characterized the instant prosecution as one of concurrent jurisdiction by dual sovereigns, state
and nation, each of which might punish offenses against its own
peace and dignity. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
54. 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941).
55. Transcript of Record, Vol. I, p. 25, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956).
56. This was the provision of the Internal Security (McCarran) Act.
64 Stat 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 796 (1952), which states: "The foregoing
provisions of this subchapter shall be construed as being in addition to and
not in modification of existing criminal statutes." There is no clear indication as to whether or not this reference includes state laws.
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Nelson's conviction on the opinion written by Judge Montgomery "
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Nelson secured
a reversal of his conviction by a 4-1 decision. Justice Jones for the
court recognized, but found it unnecessary to reach, a number of
serious constitutional objections, both substantive and procedural,
which had been urged against the statute, the indictment, and the
conduct of Nelson's trial. 58 The majority based its reversal squarely
upon the proposition that the Smith Act precluded Pennsylvania
from prosecuting sedition against the United States. Although the
indictment had clearly charged Nelson with offenses against the
state of Pennsylvania,59 Justice Jones declared that he had searched
the record in vain for evidence of a single seditious act or utterance
directed against the Commonwealth. Moreover, in his words, "it
is difficult to conceive of an act of sedition against a State in our
federated system that is not at once an act of sedition against the
Government of the United States,-the Union of the forty-eight
component States." 6° Justice Jones concluded that "it is only alleged
57 172Pa. Super. 125, 92 A.2d 431 (1952)
58. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 63, 104 A.2d 133, 136 (1954).
The circumstances of Nelson's indictment and trial are so remarkable that
it may be of interest to set out Nelson's arguments on this point as suimarized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
"Thus, the appellant charges that he was refused a reasonable postponement of the trial, which he sought in order to pursue his effort to
obtain counsel, and was thereby denied due process of law, citing Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, that the trial judge, who was an incorporator,
officer and member of the executive committee of a local nonprofit corporation, known as "Americans Battling Communism", which had publicly demanded the defendant's indictment, deprived him of due process
by refusing to disqualify himself, citing Tunicy v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
534, and Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 290, 152 A. 33, that the prosecutor
in the information upon which the indictment was founded and chief
witness against the defendant at the trial was a member of the same
court in which the indictment was returned and the trial had, and that
the district attorney indulged in improper, prejudicial and inflammatory
remarks throughout the trial and, particularly, in liis address to the
jury."
377 Pa. 58, 63, 104 A.2d 133, 136 (1954) Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, who was personally responsible for Nelson's indictment (being at that time a judge both of the Court of Common Pleas
and the Court of Quarter Sessions in Allegheny County) and had been a
leading prosecution witness at the trial, (see Transcript of Record, Vols. I.
II, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (passim) took no part in
the supreme court's decision.
59. Eight of the twelve counts in the indictment alleged acts of sedition directed specifically against the government of Pennsylvania or its
officers. Transcript of Record, Vol. I, pp. 9-25, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956)
60. 377 Pa. 58, 69, 104 A.2d 133, 139 (1954) The Solicitor General was
later to contend that the converse was equally true, i.e., that an act of
sedition against the United States was necessarily also an act of sedition
against the state in which it is committed. Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae, p. 13, n. 3, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)
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sedition against the United States with which the instant case is
concerned. ' 6
In holding that the Smith Act precluded enforcement of the
Pennsylvania statute, Justice Jones rested his decision on two principal grounds. First, he declared that where both state and federal
governments have legislated in a field of paramount importance to
the latter, the federal legislation must be taken to supersede the
state's, and that the federal government could have no more dominant interest than the maintenance of its own existence. The full
stature of the federal concern, he said, was recognized and provided for in the duty which the Constitution lays upon the United
States to guarantee to every state in the union a republican form
of government. Congress undertook to fulfill this duty by enactment of legislation which prohibited the attempted overthrow of
"the government of the United States or the government of any
State, Territory, District or Possession thereof. . . ."0 Justice
Jones stated that "Federal pre-emption could hardly be more clearly indicated." 63 Second, a majority of the Pennsylvania court
thought that the law under which Nelson was prosecuted gave
promise of obstructing or hindering congressional purposes." Potential interference was found in the disparity of sentences prescribed by federal and Pennsylvania law for the same offense, since
this disparity "could not help but confuse and hinder the attack on
sedition, which calls for uniform action on a national basis." 3
Justice Jones further expressed strong disapproval of the provisions of the Pennsylvania law permitting indictment upon information of a private individual8 Pointing to the opportunities thus
afforded for the venting of personal spite, he stated that defense
of the nation should be a public and not a private undertaking, and
that were the task accomplished by the central administration of
the federal government, the right of the individual to freely criticize the government might better be maintained. In a brief concurring opinion Chief Justice Stem, joined by Justices Stearne and
Chidsey, after expressing full agreement with what justice Jones
had written, added that:
61. Ibid.
62. The Smith Act as revised in 1948. 54 Stat. 670, as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
63. 377 Pa. 58, 70, 104 A.2d 133, 139 (1954).
64. This was referred to as the "primary" test in Hincs v. Davidowilt.
See note 31 supra.
65. 377 Pa. 58, 70, 104 A.2d 133, 139 (1954).

66. This feature of the Pennsylvania law had, in fact, been utilized in the
Nelson case. See note 58 supra.
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"Sedition against the United States is not a local offense.
It is a crime against the Nation. As such, it should be prosecuted and punished in the Federal courts where this defendant has
in fact been prosecuted and convicted and is now under sentence. It is not only important but vital that such prosecution
should be exclusively within the control of the Federal Go%"67
ernment.
Justice Bell entered a lengthy and vigorous dissent. He contended that since the power of the federal government to punish
sedition is concededly not exclusive, supersedure can occur only
when there is a direct and positive conflict between state and federal acts. Having established his criterion, Justice Bell argued that
there was no conflict between the two acts, and that neither the text
of the federal statute nor the circumstances of its enactment gave
the slightest indication that Congress in passing the Smith Act intended to take full control of the field. He cited that section of Title
18 of the United States Code which provides "Nothing in this title
shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts
of the several States under the laws thereof," 8 and he introduced
into his opinion a portion of a letter written by the author of the
Smith Act to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, in which the
writer stated that Congress had never at any time intended to oust
the states' concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute subversive activities. 69
Justice Bell's dissent also stressed the decisions upholding the
concurrent jurisdiction of states and the federal government to punish for offenses against their respective sovereigntes. 70 These decisions were offered to show that double jeopardy is not created
where the same acts constitute separate offenses against separate
sovereigns, and that accordingly there is no basis for concluding
that state action might hinder the operation of federal law by making a constitutional plea of double jeopardy available in bar of a
second prosecution. If it is assumed that two sovereigns are properly involved, this proposition respecting double jeopardy appears
67 377 Pa. 58, 76, 104 A.2d 133, 142 (1954).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1952).

69. The letter had been submitted to the Court by the Attorney General

of Pennsylvania as a ground for reargument after the majority rendered its
decision. Its use as bearing upon congressional intent prior to passage of the
act would appear to be of dubious propriety, see Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction, 504 (3d ed. 1943), although the Solicitor General,
in the amicus brief he submitted to the United States Supreme Court argued,
citing cases, that this was not merely an ex post facto interpretation, but
rather the author's present recollection of the facts at the time of the bill's
enactment. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 27, n. 17 Penn-

sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
70.

Including, inter alia, the decisions cited at note 39 supra.
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to be amply supported in the decisions. In the view of Justice Jones,
however, sedition against the United States is not an offense against
the state, and separate offenses are not committed in such a case.
Hence the "concurrent jurisdiction cases" are not in point. The
opinion for the majority, moreover, quite dearly did not allude to
double jeopardy in any constitutional sense. Justice Jones had been
concerned rather with the possibility of double punishment and its
attendant inferences respecting congressional intent.
IV
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision attracted widespread attention, particularly from state law officers charged with
the enforcement of legislation similar to the Pennsylvania Act.71
Their interest was further heightened when the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the decision, although in the interim
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire had expressly declined to
follow the Pennsylvania Court.72 Mr. Louis C. Wyman, Attorney
General of the State of New Hampshire, served as the leader and
spokesman for this group of state officers. He filed a brief amicus
curiae joined by the attorneys general of twenty-four states, and
he presented an oral argument to the Court. The Solicitor-General
of the United States, at the Court's invitation, 3 set forth the view
of the federal government in a brief and in oral argument. He contended that the Pennsylvania law should be upheld. Several other
briefs of amid curiae were filed, both in connection with the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari and with respect to the
merits of Pennsylvania's appeal. 7' And finally briefs were submitted and arguments made on behalf of the Commonwealth of Penn71. The National Association of Attorneys General, an association

which includes the attorneys general of all the states and territories, made
the Nelson decision a major topic of discussion at its 1954 and 1955 conferences. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1954, p. 16, col 4-6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 13,
1955, p. 25, col 1. At the second of these conferences United States Attorney
General Brownell stated on behalf of the federal government that: "W'e
believe that state sedition laws should be enforced and that a full measure of
Federal state cooperation will be in the public interest." N.Y. Times, Sept.
15, 1955, p. 19, col. 1-2. More recent opinion among state law enforcement
officers has not, however, been unanimous. At the 1956 conference of the
Association there was considerable support for the Supreme Court's decision.
N.Y. Times. May 23, 1956, p. 12, col. 3.

72. Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 49, 105 A.2d 756, 769 (1954).

Although the decision was concerned primarily with a legislative resolution
authorizing an investigation into violations of the state anti-subversive law,

the New Hampshire court stated that the Smith Act did not preclude state
legislation "on the same subject matter." Ibid.

73. The invitation was extended in the Court's grant of certiorari, 348
U.S. 814 (1954).
74. These briefs are listed in note 17 supra.
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sylvania and of Steve Nelson. Thus the Supreme Court approached
the case fully advised as to the wide range of important issues involved and with an appreciation of the really significant impact ol
governmental and private interests which its decision could be expected to have. Before examining the opinions which emerged from
this mass of opposing contentions, it may be useful to summarize
the arguments of counsel for the petitioner and for the respondent.
Pennsylvania's first question for the Court was
"Does a state have the power to enact a sedition law making criminal acts committed within its territory which advocate
overthrowing of the government of the State or the United
States by force or vilence ,
The petitioner thus invited a decision as to the power of Pennsylvania respecting acts of sedition directed against the government
of the state, as well as acts directed against the United States. While
this statement of the question was apparently grounded on the fact
that the Pennsylvania law made it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the government of Pennsylvania, and that Nelson was
actually indicted for such acts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
expressly found that no evidence of sedition against the Commonwealth appeared in the record, and had accordingly concerned itself
only with the charges relating to sedition against the United States.
The United States Supreme Court did not accept the petitioner's
formulation of the issue.
In its argument petitioner contended first that Pennsylvania had
the power, as a part of its inherent right of self-preservation, to
make it a crime to advocate within its territory the overthrow of
the government of the United States by force or violence. Though
nominally directed against the United States, such acts in Pennsylvania would necessarily result in the death of Pennsylvania citizens and the destruction of Pennsylvania property Moreover, under the police power Pennsylvania has the right to move against
the dangers of violent overthrow before plans looking to this end
are actually carried out,70 and Pennsylvania alone has a local police
organization adequate to cope with these dangers.
75. Brief for Petitioner, p. 5, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497

(1956).

76. Citing and relying particularly upon Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925), which upheld New York's Criminal Anarchy Statute
against constitutional attack, the Court declaring that a state "cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and

safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the
public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction.
Id. at 669.
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Petitioner interpreted Article IV, section 4, of the Constitution
to mean that the federal government may intervene in cases of domestic violence only on application of the state. Nor, in petitioner's
view, did Congress intend that the Smith Act should supersede the
Pennsylvania law. First, nothing in the Smith Act indicates such
an intent. Had Congress wished to preclude the enforcement of
state laws, it would have unequivocally so stated. Second, no conflict exists between the federal and state legislation, and the Court
has held that a state may be prohibited from exercising its police
power only where a direct and positive conflict with a federal law
is shown to exist. Third, the decisions of the Court in which supersedure has been found involve regulatory statutes. The Smith Act
is not a law of this type. Rather, the laws here involved are criminal
statutes which are traditionally the prerogative of states, there being
no provision m the Constitution for a general federal criminal code,
and no federal common law of crimes. Finally, section 3231 of Title
18, United States Code, expressly provides that nothing in that
title shall be held to impair the jurisdiction of state courts under
state laws.
Petitioner placed particular reliance on the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilbert v. Minnesota,7 which held that the Federal
Espionage Act of 1917 did not suspend the operation of a Minnesota law which made it a misdemeanor to publicly advocate that
men should not enlist in the military forces of the United States
or Minnesota. The federal law provided for the punishment, ter
alia, of persons willfully obstructing the recruiting or enlistment
service of the United States. Petitioner stressed the applicability of
the following language from the decision to the question of sedition"... The United States is composed of the States, the States
are constituted of the citizens of the United States, who also
are citizens of the States, and it is from these citizens that
armies are raised and wars waged, and whether to victory and
its benefits, or to defeat and its calamities, the States as well
as the United States are intimately concerned
. this country
is one composed of many and must on occasions be animated
as one and that the constituted and constituting sovereignties
must have power of cooperation against the enemies of all
"5
The same decision was cited for the principle that federal and
state governments have concurrent power to punish the same acts
when they constitute separate offenses against each sovereign. Nor
in petitioner's view could double jeopardy be urged as an objection
77. 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
78. Id. at 329.
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to prosecution under Pennsylvania's law, since a crime under federal law and a crime under state law are not the "same offense"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment, and that amendment
is a restriction upon the federal government alone.
Counsel for Steve Nelson, understandably wishing not to become embroiled in a controversy as to whether states could enforce
their laws against attempts to overthrow state and local governments, stated the issue for resolution by the Supreme Court more
narrowly than had the petitioner. As framed by the respondent, the
issue was, "whether the state can enact or enforce a law making
sedition 'against the United States' a crime in the face of an identical federal law on that same subject." 9 This statement of the issue
appears to be the more accurate reflection of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's view as to what it was deciding in the Nelson case.
Respondent began his argument by stating that the constitutional bases of federal power to prohibit sedition, s° and the nature
and source of sedition itself, combine to produce a paramount federal interest, and at the same time clearly indicate that the problem
is not suited to handling on a local basis. Moreover, the legislative
history of the Smith Act and the congressional findings preceding
the Internal Security and Communist Control Acts show that the
problem of sedition raises questions of foreign policy peculiarly
within federal competence to resolve. It was urged, on Nelson's
behalf, that the same considerations supported a conclusion that
Pennsylvania's law should not be judged as a local police measure
of the type traditionally within the scope of state authority State
sovereignty exists, the argument continued, with respect to matters affecting the citizens of a single state alone, and not matters
which affect citizens of the nation as a whole. 8 1 Sedition against the
United States does not concern the citizens of Pennsylvania alone.
Since in his view federal power was here exercised in an area
of dominant federal interest where the states do not enjoy reserved
79. Brief for Respondent, p. 9, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956).
80. With respect to the power "to provide for the common defense",
respondent noted that this was one of the few federal powers appearing also
in the Constitution's preamble, and that it is a power so fundamental that
it would necessarily be implied had it never been expressly granted. Id. at 23.
81. Citing Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that "Mv own general idea
was, that the States should severally preserve their sovereignty in whatever
concerns them alone, and that whatever may concern another State. or any
foreign nation, should be made a part of federal sovereignty." (2 Memoir,
Correspondence and Miscellanies from the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, p.
230, letter to Mr. Wythe (1829), Brief for Respondent, p. 27, Pennsylvania
v Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)
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powers, the respondent contended that the tests for supersession
employed in areas of concurrent federal and state power were not
applicable. Here there is rather a presumption that state laws are
superseded unless Congress has expressly consented to share its
powers, and since Congress has given no indication of such consent, the existence of the federal law precludes the enforcement of
the Pennsylvania statute. In addition to a presumption of supersedure, respondent contended that several further factors indicated
pre-emption: (1) Congress through the enactment of three major
laws had occupied the field; (2) The state law conflicted with the
federal, both as to procedure and as to penalties; (3) The state
act was a potential obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes; (4) Double or multiple punishment would be inflicted for
the identical acts if state and federal laws were permitted to coexist, and Congress cannot be presumed to have intended so harsh
a consequence. Moreover, a plea of double jeopardy based on a
state prosecution might actually operate to bar a federal Smith Act
proceeding.8 2
In response to the argument that acts of sedition against the
United States are ipso facto acts of sedition against the state, the
respondent asserted that the federal system presupposes dual sovereignties, each operating within its own constitutional sphere, and
each possessing different capacities and responsibilities. Thus true
sedition against a state consists in an attempt to overthrow the government of the state, not the government of the nation. A state's
undoubted interest in having sedition against the United States
suppressed does not confer upon it the power to act outside its
proper sphere. The respondent distinguished the case of dual sovereignties penalizing the same acts when these constitute an offense within the competence of each to punish. Here Pennsylvania,
in the view of the respondent, was improperly attempting to occupy
the same plane of control as the federal government.
Throughout the brief, counsel for Nelson drew heavily upon
the prior Supreme Court resolutions of supersedure questions in
Hines v. Davidowitz and Houston v. Moore. The Hines case grew
out of an Alien Registration Act adopted by Pennsylvania in 1939.
A year later Congress enacted a comprehensive Federal Registration Act which also placed aliens under a duty to register, though
82. The dubious merits of this contention were discussed in notes 37
and 38 mipra.
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there were important differences between the two statutes. 8 3 Justice

Black for a majority of the Court in that case held that Congress
had foreclosed the possibility of state action respecting the registration of aliens. Respondent viewed the decision as widely applicable
to Pennsylvania's sedition law, stating that
Here, as in Hines, we have a subject 'intimately blended
and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government', here, as in Hines, various aspects of civil liberties are
involved, here, as in Hines, the subject is a national one, requiring legislation on a national scale, and here, as in Hines,
the field
is one in which there is no traditional state power to
4

act.

In the Houston case the validity of still another Pennsylvania
law had been called into question. A federal law subjected to penalties persons failing to respond to the President's call for service
in the federal militia. These penalties were to be imposed by a
court-martial convened under federal law Pennsylvania had provided that a court-martial called under state law might prescribe the
same penalties for the same offense, though such acts were not made
a crime against the state. The Supreme Court through Justice
Washington, Justice Story dissenting, upheld the Pennsylvania law
as a proper effort to assist in the enforcement of the federal statute.
It was respondent's contention that both majority and dissenting
opinions agreed that Pennsylvania could not have made the identical offense illegal under state law Quotations such as the following
were offered from the lengthy dictim of Justice Washington
"If, in a specified case, the people have thought proper to
bestow certain powers on Congress as the safest depositary of
them, and Congress has legislated within the scope of them, the
83. The distinctions to which the Court attached primary significance

were the absence from the federal law of any requirement that the alien

carry and be able to produce a card, and the absence from the state law of
willfullness as an element of the punishable offense. It was clear that in
general, the state law imposed the more onerous restrictions. In the view of
Justice Black these restrictions ran counter to the congressional purpose.
which was to "protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through
one uniform national registration system, and to leave them free from the
possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance.
" 312 U.S.
58, 74 (1941). Concern for the liberties of the alien as a basis for this decision is often overlooked by those who have sought subsequently to distinguish
it. Justice Stone, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice
McReynolds, dissented. He would have required a showing of direct conflict
between state and federal laws, and he would not assume that Congress was
unavare of existing state laws touching the same subject when it enacted
the federal statute. Dual burdens upon the alien were held to be the necessary result of dual sovereignty.
84. Brief for Respondent, p. 38, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956)
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people have reason to complain that the same powers should be
exercised at the same time by the State legislature. To subject
them to the operation of two laws upon the same subject, dictated by distinct wills, particularly in a case inflicting pains and
penalties, is, to my apprehension, something very much like oppression, if not worse. In short, I am altogether incapable of
comprehending how two distinct wills can, at the same time, be
exercised in relation to the same subject, to be effectual, and
at the same time compatible with each other. If they correspond
in every respect, then the latter is idle and inoperative, if they
differ, they must, in the nature of things, oppose each other, so
far as they do differ. If the one imposes a certain punishment
for a certain offense, the presumption is, that this was deemed
sufficient, and, under all circumstances the only proper one. If
the other legislature imposes a different punishment, in kind
or degree, I am at a loss to conceive how they can both consist
harmoniously together.""5
Respondent distinguished Gilbert v. Minnesota as upholding a
statute construed to have for its purpose the prevention of breaches
of the peace, and actually applied to Gilbert in a situation of that
nature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed no such construction on Pennsylvania's sedition law, even had the express language
and penalties of the act permitted it. Nor was mention made in that
case of the decision in Houston v. Moore.
The respondent urged that various practical considerations further supported his belief that Congress had pre-empted the field.
First, a decision voiding the Pennsylvania law would not affect the
right of states to outlaw acts of sedition directed at their own governments and to cooperate in the enforcement of federal statutes.
Second, the record of prosecutions under the Smith Act indicated
that federal action against subversion would be vigorous and effective.s6 Third, the work of combatting the Communist conspiracy
demanded the attention of competent professionals at the federal
85. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1820). Cited m Brief for Respondent, pp.
30-31, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Petitioner devoted a
substantial portion of its reply brief to the Houston case, pointing to other

and more favorable language in the various opinions and distinguishing the
case altogether with the argument that there Pennsylvania sought to aid the
President in the enforcement of a federal law, while in the instant case
Pennsylvania was enforcing its own statute. Reply Brief for Petitioner, p. 4,
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
86. As of June 30, 1955, the Justice Department had obtained the arrest

of 131 persons on Smith Act charges, and had secured the conviction of 90 of
these. Department of Justice Press Release, July 18, 1955, cited in Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 31, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497

(1956).
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level.8 Finally, enforcement of any sedition laws impinged so closely upon important civil liberties that a dual system of enforcement
of such laws might be inconsistent with the maintenance of personal freedoms. As a significant addendum to this last point, respondent stated that "the record in this very case so indicates."
In a second portion of his brief, not to be further considered
here, the respondent asked the Court to consider serious constitutional objections to the indictment and to provisions of the Pennsylvania law, on the basis that the Court might properly affirm an
opinion below on grounds other than those which had controlled
the prior decision.
V
Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion of the Court, which
affirmed the decision below that the Smith Act rendered Pennsylvania's law unenforceable. He was careful to limit this approval to
the precise question decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
And he further circumscribed the Court's holding with the declaration that
"
The decision in this case does not affect the right of
States to enforce their sedition laws at times when the Federal
Government has not occupied the field and is not protecting the
entire country from seditious conduct.
Nor does it limit
the jurisdiction of the States where the Constitution and Congress have specifically given them concurrent jurisdiction, as
was done under the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead
Act. United States v.Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 Neither does it limit
the right of the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds. Nor does it prevent the
State from prosecuting where the same act constitutes both a
federal offense and a state offense under the police power, as
was done in
Gilbert v Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, relied
upon by petitioner as authority heren." 88
After thus limiting the effect of what the Court was about to say,
Chief Justice Warren proceeded in orderly fashion to prepare the
way for the pre-emption doctrines that were to rule the case. Ie
did this by observing both that Congress had not expressly declared
87 Respondent cited a 1954 public interview with J.Edgar Hoover, in
which the FBI Director stated. "Investigating subversives is a highly professional job
in World War II, I was approached by groups who
wanted to help investigate. They wanted badges and authority to make investigations of their own. I flatly refused. I knew the work had to be handled
by professionals
I told them to turn their information over to the
F.B.I.-not to investigate, themselves." Brief for Respondent, p. 66, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
88. 350 U.S. 497, 500 (1956).
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any intentions respecting state laws, and that no constitutional prohibitions upon the power of the states to act were involved. Absent
these factors, he continued, the Court has employed varying criteria
in its decisions. Categorizing these as "tests of supersession," he
selected three as requiring a rejection of Pennsylvania's efforts to
prosecute Steve Nelson.
(1) The Pervasive Characterof FederalRegulation in the Field
of Sedition and Subversion Makes Reasonable the Inference that
Congress Left No Room for the States to Act. Reliance for this
proposition was placed upon a case involving the exercise of federal
power under the commerce clause.89 Chief Justice Warren established its applicability in the case under consideration by summarizing major provisions of the three principal federal statutes aimed
at subversion-the Smith Act of 1940, the Internal Security Act
of 1950, and the Commumst Control Act of 1954. Taking these acts
as a whole, he concluded that they "evince a Congressional plan
which makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left
for the States to supplement it. Therefore, a state sedition statute
is superseded regardless of whether it purports to supplement the
federal law "90

(2) The Federal Interest in Resisting and Protecting Against
Internal Subversion is so Dominant that Federal Legislation Must
be Presumed to Preclude the Enforcement of State Laws Touching
the Same Subject. Chief Justice Warren demonstrated this supremacy of federal interest by referring both to what Congress had done
and what it had said. The congressional program for meeting totalitarian aggression was viewed in its entirety as including the
strengthening of our external defenses, the guarding of freedom
throughout the world, and the furnishing of protection against internal subversion. As part of this plan, the FBI and the CIA were
given the "responsibility for intelligence concerning Communist
seditious activities against our Government." Further, Congress
had clearly regarded such activities as part of a world conspiracy 01
And in proscribing sedition against local, state and national governments it grounded its action upon the federal duty "to provide
89. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
90. 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956). Chief Justice Warren here used the oftcited language of Justice Holmes in Charleston R.L v. Varnville Furniture
Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) "When Congress has taken the particular
subject matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a
state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than
Congress has seen fit to go."
91. See note 44 spra.
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for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United
States as an independent nation, and to guarantee to each State
a republican form of government.
,,92
Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Congress had treated seditious conduct as a matter of vital national concern, it was not in any sense a local enforcement problem.
(3) "Enforcement of State Sedition Acts Presents a Serious
Danger of Conflict with the Administration of the Federal Program." Chief Justice Warren stated that since 1939, the federal government had urged the states not to intervene in the action it was
taking against subversion, but to turn over all relevant information
to federal authorities.9 3 The Pennsylvania law was held to present
a further and peculiar danger of interference with the federal program in that indictments may be had upon informations brought by
private persons. Here Chief Justice Warren adopted the views of
Justice Jones of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, including his
statement that "defense of the Nation by law, no less than by arms,
should be a public and not a private undertaking."9 4 Speaking more
broadly of state anti-sedition statutes, Chief Justice Warren noted
particularly their lack of uniformity, the absence of successful prosecutions under these laws for attempts to destroy local or state governments, and the omission from some acts of important safeguards
for the protection of fundamental rights. He indicated that statutes
of this latter type do not comport with the congressional purpose
"to protect freedom from those who would destroy it, without infringing upon the freedom of all our people." In a like situation in
the field of labor-management relations, he added, Justice Jackson
had written
"A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are
quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications
as are different rules of substantive law "05
And here, Chief Justice Warren observed that different criteria for
judging substantive offenses still further increases the potentiality or
likelihood of conflict with federal enforcement.
With the decision thus resting upon his three conclusions respecting occupation of the field, dominant interest of the federal
government, and conflict between the enforcement of state acts and
92. See note 50 supra.
93. Excerpts from statements by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
J. Edgar Hoover, dated respectively 1939 and 1940, were set out in the
Court's opinion. 350 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1956).
94. 377 Pa. 58, 74-75, 104 A.2d 133, 141 (1954).
95. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953)
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the federal plan, the Chief Justice declined to venture any opinion
as to the constitutionality of double punishment for the same acts
directed against the United States. But "without compelling indication to the contrary, we will not assume that Congress intended to
permit the possibility of double punishment."90
From this decision Justice Reed, with whom Justices Burton
and Minton joined, dissented. Their opinion takes up each of the
three grounds for the majority decision, and concludes that none of
them offers a proper basis for denying to Pennsylvania power to
enforce its sedition act.
(1) The doctrine that comprehensive federal action spells out
congressional occupation of the field, said Justice Reed, is one
developed in decisions concerning legislation under the commerce
clause and was intended "to prevent partitioning of this country
by locally erected trade barriers." This doctrine and the decisions
from which it springs can have no application to anti-sedition laws,
he stated, since the federal laws are "distinct criminal statutes"
which do not create or require administrative regulation. Consequently questions of conflict with a general congressional regulatory
scheme do not arise. State penal laws, moreover, are particularly
entitled to judicial respect, and it should not lightly be presumed that
Congress wished to void them. Justice Reed concluded that as
Congress has since 1940 been aware of the existence and continued
growth in the number of state anti-subversive laws, the states
should not be precluded from enforcing their acts without a clear
mandate to that effect from Congress itself.
(2) In the view of the dissenters, the assumption that the
federal interest in suppressing sedition is so dominant as to oust
state power proceeds from a mistaken reliance upon the decision in
Hines v. Davidowitz. Justice Reed read that case as meaning only
that a nationwide integrated system of alien registration bore so
directly on foreign relations that Congress must clearly have intended only the one uniform system.97 The decision thus involved
96. 350 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1956), citing Houston v. Moore. 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 1, 31 (1820), and Jerome v. 'United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105
(1943).
97. Judge Montgomery m the trial court opinion had declared that

Hines involved the protection of aliens enjoying rights under treaties which
were the exclusive concern of the federal government, Commonwealth v.
Nelson, 172 Pa. Super. 125, 128, 92 A. 2d 431, 434 (1952). Justice Bell in his
dissent from the decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had stated:
"A reading of the majority opinion makes it clear that the basis for the

decision was the Court's conviction that a State Alien Registration Act would
likely involve us in grave international controversies and might even lead
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the elements of a regulatory apparatus and an intimate relation to
foreign policy with which the Court was not confronted in Nelson.
With respect to the problem of internal subversion, Justice Reed
asserted, "there is no 'dominant interest'" The enactment by state
and federal government of criminal statutes in fulfillment of their
respective responsibilities rather presents the situation treated by
the Court in Gilbert v. Minnesota. Justice Reed pointed to language
in that decision indicating that the Minnesota law had been specifically upheld against the contention that power to punish interference with enlistments in the United States military forces was an
exclusive congressional prerogative.98 Only alternatively, declared
Justice Reed, did the Supreme Court sustain the Minnesota statute
as a simple exercise of the police power.
(3) With respect to the asserted conflict between the administration of Pennsylvania's law and the enforcement of the federal
act, Justice Reed found the statements of the executive department
quoted in the majority opinion insufficient to establish any desire
on the part of the federal enforcement officers to have the field to
themselves. On the contrary, Justice Reed contended, the Department of Justice's brief amicus curiae in the present proceeding
states most unequivocally
"The administration of the various state laws has not, in the
course of the fifteen years that the federal and state sedition
laws have existed side by side, in fact interfered with, embarrassed, or impeded the enforcement of the Smith Act."""
The fear of possible conflict, Justice Reed concluded, is not a valid
reason for nullifying state power.
With the three pre-emption theories of the majority thus disto war. No such result could possibly ensue from State treason or Sedition
laws, and the case is clearly distinguishable on its facts." Commonwealth v.

Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 101, 104 A.2d 133, 154 (1954). The reference in the Hines
case to a single uniform system of legislation recalls a judicial test which has
been used in commerce clause cases since the decision in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The concept which the Court there developed was that where the subject of regulation
demands a uniform national system, state regulation is precluded in the
absence of congressional assent. While there would appear to be a place for
this idea in the area of anti-subversive legislation, it does not appear ill any
of the decided cases as a distinct ground of decision.

98. Thus in speaking of Minnesota's effort to prohibit interference with

federal military enlistments, the Court had stated that "to do so is not to
usurp a National power, it is only to render a service to its people.

254 U.S. 325, 331 (1920).

99. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 30, Pennsylvania v.

Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)

Moreover, Justice Reed quite clearly has the

better of the argument when he characterizes the statements offered by the
Court as essentially a call for state aid in the collection of useful information,
rather than a declaration that the states had no business in the field.
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cussed and disposed of, Justice Reed turned to what he believed to
be an independently decisive ground upon which to reverse the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. This was section 3231 of Title 18 of
the United States Code.100 Justice Reed declared that the section is
clear authorization by Congress to the states to proceed in any
constitutionally permissible areas in the absence of express congressional prohibition. In his view, the section "recognizes the fact
that maintenance of order and fairness rests primarily with the
States." Justice Reed's dissent concludes with the observation that
state and nation had here legislated within constitutional limits
against sedition, and that, referring to these legislative judgments,
"Courts should not interfere."
VI
Since the Court's decision in the Nelson case represents its
conclusions respecting congressional intent, and since it does so
on the basis of doctrines laid down in prior decisions and considered
applicable in testing the Pennsylvania law, an appraisal of the decision should address itself to two questions" (1) Did the Court
make proper use of pre-emption doctrines? (2) Was the Court
successful in finding the real intent of Congress?
The initial problem is the application of commerce clause precedent in concluding that Congress had occupied the field. The doctrine depends upon the existence of a pervasive congressional regulatory scheme. Even assuming that multiple federal statutes not
requiring administration by a federal agency would not meet this
test, it is clear that when the Smith Act is taken together with the
Internal Security and Communist Control Acts, an occupation of
the field has occurred within the meaning of the Court's prior decisions. The Internal Security Act is an elaborate registration statute
demanding the services of a special administrative body, and the
Communist Control Act extended this regulatory approach.""'
100. This is reproduced in the text at note 68 stpra.
101. Act of Sept. 23, 1950 c. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified, as
amended, in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.) ; Act of Aug. 24, 1954,
Pub. L. No. 637, 68 Stat. 775 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
Broadly speaking, these acts penalize the failure on the part of certain organizations therein defined to register and file detailed annual reports with the
Attorney General. In some cases individuals as well as groups must register.
The initial determination as to whether an organization falls within the statutory categories is made by the Subversive Activities Control Board-a specialized administrative body created by the Internal Security Act. In 1954 Congress eliminated one step m this procedure by declaring that the Communist
Party was a "Commumst-action organization" within the meaning of the
earlier law. Despite strong pressure to do so, however, it did not radically depart from the basic notion of registration, and even created a new statutory
concept-the "Communist-infiltrated" organization. See Note, Federal Antn-
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The fact that federal power over commerce among the states
enjoys greater constitutional stature than federal power over sedition does not destroy the usefulness of commerce cases as precedent,
since in both instances the occupancy test is employed to discover
congressional intent, and the validity of the inference drawn from
an elaborate legislative plan does not depend upon the constitutional
source or strength of federal power. While decisions holding federal
power under the commerce clause to be exclusive or supreme were
doubtless intended, as a minority of the Supreme Court asserts, to
forestall the erection of local barriers to a national commerce, a
national approach to the problem of sedition could be Balkanized by
the states with equally unfortunate effect. The Court had already
used the notion of occupancy in the Hines case, moreover, where the
subject of legislation was not unrelated to the problem of sedition,
and where the Court's own decision makes it clear that exclusive
federal power was not involved. Granting that the Smith Act alone
did not create the extensive system of regulation set up in the Alien
Registration Act, it would be utterly unrealistic to omit the Internal Security and Communist Control Acts from consideration in
determining the scope of the congressional plan. Communists are
prosecuted under the Smith Act, they will be prosecuted for a
failure to register under the Internal Security Act if the Subversive
Activities Control Board completes the necessary findings, and
they are directed to register and are placed under certain other
disabilities in the Communist Control Act. The mischief sought to
be remedied in each of these statutes is essentially the same, the
threat posed by domestic Communism.
The rightness of the Court's second conclusion, respecting the
dominance of the federal interest in combatting sedition, is also
difficult to dispute. The Solicitor General of the United States,
arguing for Pennsylvania as amicus curiae, conceded as much in
no uncertain terms. 10 2 The Constitution itself creates this dominance
Subversve Legislation of 1954, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 631 (1955). And for a
notion of the difficulties which have arisen in the administration of the
Internal Security Act, see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956), reversing a decision which upheld an order of
the Board directing the Communist Party to register under the Act. 223

F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court remanded to the Board for

findings respecting the allegedly tainted testimony of three witnesses who
had appeared before it at the Communist Party hearings. Subsequently the

Board expunged the offending testimony and reissued its order. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 19, 1956, p. 23, col. 3.
102. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 9, Penn-

sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). "There can be no real question as

to the paramount interest of the federal government in the prevention of sedi-

tion." The Solicitor General took the further position, however, that the
paramount nature of the federal interest did not make it exclusive.
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by the very fact of a federal union, and Congress has accorded it
express legislative recognition. 10 3 The nature of the Communist
conspiracy, moreover, adds very substantially to the weight of federal interest. This is no loose group of isolated domestic agitators
parading under a common name, but a highly centralized organization controlled from a nation to which the United States is currently and grimly opposed on a global basis. Domestic policy respecting the Communist Party in the United States should at least
ideally be carefully coordinated with foreign policy respecting its
0
Soviet master.0'
The federal government alone is in a position to
wage the "cold war" with unity of purpose and action. The argument that state and local governments would fall with the federal
government were an internal conspiracy to succeed confuses concern with responsibility. Foreign invasion would produce the same
result, but few would suggest that each state should raise its own
army even if the Constitution were to permit it.
If this view of the present problem of sedition is correct, the
Supreme Court seems fully justified in following the conclusions as
to federal dominance and resulting supersedure which were reached
in the Hines case. Only a very superficial analysis can assign that
decision to a separate and sacrosanct category labelled "aliens and
foreign relations." The concern there was plainly with alien registration acts, but the applicability of Justice Black's reasoning to the
Pennsylvania statute in the current context might, if anything, have
been more firmly pressed in the majority opinion. And the same
reasoning can be used with equal effect to distinguish the earlier
decision in Gilbert v. Minnesota. In his analysis of that, decision
as merely upholding a state police measure, Chief justice Warren
was obliged to focus upon Minnesota's law as it happened to have
been applied to Gilbert, and he was also obliged to ignore some
important language in the Supreme Court's opinion.105 Justice Reed
quite properly called attention to this omission. But Gilbert does
not appear to have belonged to a cohesive and nationwide organiza103. See note 50 supra.
104. InUnited States v. Pink, the Supreme Court said. "If state action
could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences might ensue.

The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created difficulties
with a foreign power.' 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942). The close connection between the conspiratorial activities of Communists in this country and our
relations with nations having similar ideologies was stressed in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1951). To the same effect are statements in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 427
(1950), where in a concurring opinion Justice Jackson wrote: "The [American] Commumst Party alone among Amencan parties past or present is
dominated and controlled by a foreign government."
105. See note 98 supra; text, stpra, p. 314.
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tion serving the interests of a foreign and unfriendly state.100 A
distinction on this basis would have made the Court's treatment of
the Gilbert case far more satisfying.
In its findings respecting conflict between state and federal
action against internal subversion, the Court appears to have relied
upon some very dubious evidence and to have ignored the most
accurate source of current and concrete information. The statements
of the executive branch of the federal government introduced into
the Court's opinion are now badly dated. The contrary conclusions
of the United States Solicitor General, on the other hand, were
based upon fifteen years of experience with co-existing federal and
state sedition laws, including the recent era of really vigorous
prosecution under the Smith Act. 0 7 It is true that the Court has
not always insisted upon direct evidence of existing conflict in the
administration of state and federal statutes. 08 But if potentialities
for conflict remain despite the statement by the Department of
Justice, the Court was unwilling or unable to describe them. Judged
106. Gilbert was in fact an officer of the Non-Partisan League. It is of
record that he denounced America's participation in World War I, but
there is nothing to indicate that he favored the enemy.
107 In a memorandum released October 7, 1956, Attorney General
Brownell presented the most recent figures on Smith Act proceedings. He
stated that convictions of 108 Communist leaders had been obtained under
that law in eighteen separate trials, and that "fourteen of these eighteen
successful trials have either been initiated or carried to completion since
January, 1953." N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1956, p. 15, col. 1-4.
Brownell's summary of recent Department of Justice activity directed
primarily against Communists is particularly instructive in revealing the
breadth of the federal program. In addition to the Smith Act proceedings,
he listed the following achievements:
"We have also prosecuted the agents of the international Communist
movement under several other statutes.
"Twenty Communists have been convicted for making false statements or affidavits.
"Five Communists have been convicted for perjur'.
"Four Communists have been convicted for harboring fugitives from
Smith Act prosecutions.
"Nine individual defendants are awaiting trial for violation of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act.
"One hundred and sixty nine aliens with subversive backgrounds
have been deported and seventy suits have been filed to cancel the
citizenship of Communists.
"Twenty-one petitions have been filed with the Subversive Activities Control Board against Communist fronts and two petitions have
been filed against Communist-infiltrated unions.
"Two persons have been convicted for espionage oii behalf of the
Soviet Union." Ibid.
The Attorney General concluded with a reference to eight changes or additions to existing statutes relating to subversion which had been recommended
by the Department of Justice since 1952. He also Qtqted that in 1954. a separate Internal Security Division was established within the Department.
108. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterqnn 315 U.S. 148, 156-57
(1942), Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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by anything which appears in its opinion, the Court's conclusion as
to interference and conflict is far from convincing.
Justice Reed, in dissent, was of the opinion that the general
saving clause included in the federal criminal code 0 l was in itself
sufficient indication of congressional intent to require a reversal of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Judicial reaction to the clause,
first enacted in 1825"10 and made a part of successive code revisions,
has varied videly. While Justice Reed regarded it as independently
dispositive, Chief Justice Warren declared, in a footnote addressed
to what he denominated a "subsidiary argument," that "there was
no intention to resolve particular supersession questions by the
Section." This view is quite clearly the correct one. It is the jurisdiction of the state courts under valid state statutes that is saved
by the clause, not the states' power to enact such statutes. The
respondent put the matter well in his brief with the assertion that:
"...
Reliance on that provision of law actually begs the entire
question before the Court on this writ No one questions the
"jurisdiction of the state courts to enforce valid and operable
criminal statutes, despite any provision of the Code. But the
very issue here is whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was right when it held that its own state law was not valid and
operable.. ,,I
While this approach to the clause is easily the more persuasive, it
should be recognized that the Supreme Court in Sexton v. Califonia"2 did in fact use the identical language as the basis for a
decision permitting California to punish activity also penalized in the
federal code of crimes.
Turning now to the more fundamental question, can it be said
that m striking down Pennsylvania's law the Court was carrying
out -the actual intent of Congress when that body passed the Smith
Act?"" The thesis offered here is that while at least two of the
Court's major grounds for decision represented a proper application
of precedent, they were in this context highly unrealistic guides,
and their mistaken acceptance as controlling produced a misreading
of the congressional will. The term "will' may in this instance be
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1952).
110. 4 Stat. 115 (1825).

111. Brief for Respondent, p. 17, n. 9, Pennsylvanma v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956).
112. 189 U.S. 319 (1903).
113. This judgment has the benefit of hindsight, but the Supreme
Court also had the benefit of the strong congressional reaction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision, and m any case this reaction tells little
which is legally relevant to a determination of the congressional intent when
the Smith Act was passed.
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more appropriate than "intent", since there is reason to believe that
Congress never consciously turned its attention to the problem
posed by the co-existence of state laws. 114 In situations of this sort
a court's decision is necessarily one step farther removed from
reality, since it must make its judgment on the basis of a wholly
hypothetical intent.
The actual legislative history of the Smith Act is inconclusive,
but what little of relevance there is supports a result opposite to
that reached by the Court.1 5 More important, however, the Court's
decision appears to have ignored the relatively familiar political
realities involved in the passage of this legislation. While the public
hue and cry over the problem of Communists in our midst has
doubtless grown during the years since 1940, it is nevertheless difficult to believe that the popularly elected legislators who originated
and passed the Smith Act, itself much criticized as infringing constitutional rights, were really so solicitous of individual liberties, so
sensitive to repercussions in foreign affairs, and so concerned with
the possibilities of jurisdictional conflict, that they consciously
selected a single federal measure as the exclusive means of achieving their ends. If this statement be an indictment of congressional
leadership, a number of legislators have since pleaded guilty 110
Although it would probably have been improper and unwise for
the Supreme Court to decide the Nelson case on the basis of a
candid look at these political facts of life, the Court might nevertheless have selected accepted judicial grounds for a decision in favor
of Pennsylvania. It might, for instance, have drawn the one really
persuasive inference from the fact that Congress knew all about state
anti-sedition laws. Had Congress believed that state laws were an
obstacle to achievement of the purposes embodied in the Smith Act
(and in later and related federal statutes) it seems far more likely
than not that it would have expressed this belief in unequivocal
statutory language. It has done so on other occasions, and knows
that such an expression is entitled to judicial respect.' 7 The congressional silence on the point might have been explained satisfactorily on the ground that supersedure was an eventuality which
simply did not occur to it, or occurred only to be dismissed as too
114. In the debates preceding passage of the Smith Act, Representative
Smith was asked whether there was any conflict between the federallyprescribed penalty and those fixed under state laws. He answered by saying
that "this has nothing to do with state laws." 84 Cong. Rec. 10452 (1939)
115. See note 42 supra.
116. See protest of congressmen over the Supreme Court's decision,
note 12 supra.
117 Instances are given in note 26 .rupra.

1957]

STATE CONTROL OF SEDITION

unlikely a possibility to suggest any affirmative action. Or the
Court might have chosen to observe the distinction, so strenuously
urged before it, between local penal laws and state statutes interfering with the free flow of goods in commerce. However the Court
itself might categorize state sedition laws, it might properly have
assumed that Congress would be especially solicitous of what
Congress would likely regard as state efforts at self-preservation.
Viewed from the legislative standpoint as proper police laws, the
Court might then have insisted upon evidence of a direct and positive conflict, as it has done in prior cases.118 These suggested
grounds for decision involve inferences and assumptions, but they
lie closer to the political arena in which statutes are enacted than do
the pre-emption doctrines applied by the Court.
The presumptions respecting legislative intent which have from
time to time been used by the Supreme Court to produce a finding
of pre-emption contain a substantial element of enlightened political
judgment. As a policy matter, the view that the federal interest in
combatting Communist subversion is so dominant that states should
not undertake to duplicate the federal program, particularly when
Congress has blanketed the field with comprehensive regulations,
seems both sound and wise. But judgments of this sort lie outside
the realm of judicial competence, and courts should avoid making
them, even in the name of uncovering congressional intent. The
use of pre-emption doctrines did not serve the Supreme Court well
in the Nelson case, and the tension generated by the decision between Congress and the Court may prove to have had unfortunate
consequences for the nation. If the thesis is correct that the Court
here reached a wrong result by the application of doctrines which
nevertheless had considerable support in reason and precedent, perhaps a partial answer lies in a far more sparing use by the Court
of these necessarily artificial assumptions where any indications of
the actual legislative will can be detected. Or perhaps the doctrines
should be wholly abandoned, at least if something better can be
found. But if the Court is to be defended on the ground that it delivered a judgment by congressional default,"' the ultimate and
best answer would appear to lie in the careful legislative resolution
of supersession questions before the answer must be supplied by*
118. Many of the principal cases are cited at note 24 sipra.
119. Congressional default would appear particularly evident in this
case. In enacting the Communist Control Act of 1954, Congress passed over
what seems an obvious opportunity to have expressed itself respecting the
decision rendered in the Nelson case earlier that year by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.

IINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:287

litigation. It is now for Congress to decide whether this resolution is
best reached by a general declaration of intent or by the insertion
of appropriate language in individual statutes.
VII
While there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court's decision does not threaten state security so much as it affronts state
dignity, 120 it did produce widespread confusion and concern over
the extent to which the states are now restricted in prosecuting seditious acts against their own governments. A measure of uncertainty
shows through such statements as the following, taken from the
petition to the Supreme Court for a rehearing, filed by the Attorney
General of New York on behalf of that state
"This petitioner reads the Nelson decision as not intended to
inhibit a state in prosecutions for sedition against the state as
such. It is respectfully submitted that an exact statement by
the Court on this point could serve to quell doubts which have
been voiced as to the precise import of the decision in relation
to state penal sedition laws.''2
Although it is not unlikely that Congress will make the question
academic, the extent of presently admissible state power over
sedition is a matter of no small importance to prosecutor and
prisoner who must depend upon existing law To reach a reasoned
estimate as to the remaining powers of the state, it is necessary to
re-examine the Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Court
decisions, and to consider the opinions of state courts which have
since passed on the question.
Steve Nelson was indicted for numerous acts of sedition committed against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. A jury verdict
of guilty on all counts of the indictment was sustained by two
Pennsylvania courts. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court put
these charges aside and concerned itself only with "alleged sedition
against the United States." Justice Jones for that court stated that
the record contained no evidence of seditious acts directed against
the Commonwealth. He did not, however, expressly quash portions
of the indictment which alleged such offenses on the ground of a
lack of evidence. Instead he went on to observe that it would be
120. To take Pennsylvania as an example, there are laws penalizing
the following- riots and unlawful assemblies, riotous destruction of property; disturbing public assemblies,

carrying deadly weapons, and carryin

bombs and explosives. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 4401, 4402, 4405, 4416. 441
(Purdon, 1945).
121. Petition of Attorney General of the State of New York for Rehearing of Decision of April 2, 1956, p. 3, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956)
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difficult to conceive of an act of sedition against a state which was
not at the same time an act of sedition against the United States.
Thus it is unclear whether his opinion as to offenses against the
Commonwealth rests on the state of the record or on a belief that
these offenses necessarily merged into the crime of advocating the
overthrow of the federal government. Clearly, under one interpretation Pennsylvania might be free in a given instance to prosecute
under its sedition law for activity directed against itself; on the
other interpretation it could never enjoy this power so long as
federal legislation respecting sedition remains in effect. Additional
language in Justice Jones' opinion appears very strongly to support this latter interpretation ;122 the brief concurring opinion by
three other justices could be argued as supporting the former.' "
The Supreme Court of the United States declined Pennsylvania's
invitation to pass upon the full range of state power, and expressly
affirmed only the precise holding of the Pennsylvania court. Was
this an affirmance also of the view that pure sedition against a state
was something difficult to conceive of? Chief Justice Warren did
not refer to this language in the opinion below. Rather, he set out
that portion of the court's decision which pointed to the lack of
testimony relating to seditious acts or utterances against Pennsyl-

vania. Is there a substantial basis here for reading the Supreme
Court's approval as restricted by the record?
An analysis of the United States Supreme Court's decision with
a view to ascertaining its outer edges likewise fails to produce a
definite answer. The holding in the case is clear: The Smith Act
precludes Pennsylvania from punishing Steve Nelson for acts of
sedition against the United States. It is possible to read the Nelson
case as standing for no more than that. But Chief Justice Warren's
own statement as to what the Court was not deciding offers relatively little comfort for the states. In this self-imposed list of limitations, the Court did not say that the states were free to outlaw
sedition against local and state government, though it expressly
In his decision Justice Jones wrote:
"Nor is a State stripped of its means of self-defense by the suspension of its sedition statute through the entry of the Federal Government upon the field. There are many valid laws on Pennsylvania's
statute books adequate for coping effectively with actual or threatened
internal civil disturbances. As to the nationwide threat to all citizens,
imbedded in the type of conduct interdicted by a sedition act, we are-all of us-protected by the Smith Act and in a manner more efficient
and more consistent with the service of our national welfare in all respects." 377 Pa. 58, 70, 104 A.2d 133, 139 (1954).
123. This opinion, set out virtually in its entirety in the text at note 67
122.

supra, spoke only of sedition against the United States.
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conceded the state's continued power to protect itself "against
sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds.'

24

And the declara-

tion that state power remained unimpaired "at tioes when the
Federal Government has not occupied the field and is not protecting
the entire country from seditious conduct" leaves little if any
room for state action. This is very different from saying that states
have power where the federal government has not occupied the
field.
Turning from the limitations to the grounds for decision, the
reliance upon federal legislation other than the Smith Act further
supports the view that any and all prosecution of Communist subversion by the states has been effectively pre-empted. These laws,
in the words of Chief Justice Warren, made inescapable his conclusion that "Congress has intended to occupy the field of sedition."
Presumably the "field of sedition" is not to be subdivided into
areas for state and federal cognizance, with federal occupation of
only a single sphere, the decisional language is unqualified. In
demonstrating the dominance of the federal interest, Chief justice
Warren looked again at the broad outlines of the congressional
plan, and referring to Congress he said
"
It has charged the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Central Intelligence Agency with responsibility for intelligence concerning Communist seditious activities against our
Government, and has denominated such activities as part of a
world conspiracy It accordingly proscribed sedition against all
government in the nation-national, state and local.
Congress having thus treated seditious conduct as a matter of vital
national concern, it is in no sense a local enforcement prob")125
lem.
Finally in his discussion of the danger of conflict between the enforcement of state and federal laws, the Chief Justice spoke with
little admiration of state anti-sedition laws in general, calling attention particularly to the loose way in which some of them had been
drafted, and their lack of safeguards for the protection of fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court's reasoning, making repeated use of the
degree to which federal legislation fills the field, and the broad
language used throughout the opinion, tend strongly to support
the view that the decision has an applicability well beyond the precise question it decides. The supreme courts of two states have in
124. Here Chief Justice Warren set forth that portion of Justice Jones's
opinion reproduced at note 122 supra. 350 U.S. 497, 500, n. 8 (1956)

125. 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956)
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fact now adopted this larger interpretation of the Nelson case. In
Commonwealth v. Gilbert,- the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had postponed its decision until it could proceed with the
benefit of a final determination as to the validity of Pennsylvania's
law. The defendant, Margaret Gilbert, had been indicted for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow, by force and violence, of both
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the United States. With
respect to alleged offenses against the latter, the Massachusetts
court needed only a brief paragraph in which to declare that the
Nelson case was clea.rly controlling, but its conclusion respecting
sedition against the Commonwealth required an analysis of Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in some detail. Chief Justice Qua looked
beyond the narrower question which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision had presented for review. He stated that
".... The reasoning of the opinion, however, seems to us to

carry implication beyond the case of a State prosecuting for
sedition against the United States and in substance to decide
that the Smith Act

taken in connection with the general

conspiracy provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Internal Security
Act of 1950... and the Communist Control Act of 1954..
indicates an intent on the part of Congress to occupy exclusively
the field of sedition at least where the offense charged is a
Federal crime of the type of that charged in that case, even
though alleged as a conspiracy against the State.

....

,,1.7

After summarizing the three principal grounds upon which the
Supreme Court had based its decision, Chief Justice Qua observed
that the Supreme Court would find the same grounds for decision
present in Margaret Gilbert's indictment under Massachusetts law,
whether the alleged offenses be considered statutory violations or
common law crimes .12s He then reviewed the record, including detailed specifications of what it would seek to prove which had been
drawn by the Commonwealth. These included membership in the
Communist Party and attendance at secret cell meetings held both
to study Marxist literature and to learn the techniques to be used
in the violent revolution which was to precede the establishment
of proletarian dictatorship. In language strongly suggestive of that
used by Justice Jones in the Pennsylvania case, Chief Justice Qua
126. 134 N.E2d 13 (Mass. 1956). See also Commonwealth v. Hood,
134 N.E2d 12 (Mass. 1956), where in a brief opimon the Nelson case was
similarly held to require a dismissal of e.xisting indictments.
127. Id. at 15.
128. This observation sems particularly significant in view of the gen-

erally accepted notion that nonstatutory crimnal offenses are peculiarly the
province of state administration, there being no federal common law of
crimes. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943).
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concluded that the specifications constituted only the "familiar
paraphernalia of Communist agitation for the overthrow of government in general, and cannot be directed separately and exclusively
against the government of the Commonwealth." The Massachusetts court granted motions to quash the indictment in its entirety,
but qualified its decision with the following.
"We do not wish to be understood as saying that there can
never be any instance of any kind of sedition directed so exclusively against the State as to fall outside the sweep of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Nelson. If it is to be said that
there can never be such an instance, it must be said else"129
where.
When the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Braden v. Commonwealth, 3 1 faced a situation similar in substantial respects to that
involved in the Gilbert case, it dismissed the indictment on the same
reasoning the Massachusetts court had employed and stated its
"full accord" with that decision. This accord included the qualification that "this opinion does not foreclose the possibility of a
prosecution by the Commonwealth of the crime of sedition directed
exclusively against the Commonwealth of Kentucky "I"1
The most plausible estimate of the extent to which state laws
can presently be brought to bear upon acts of sedition against the
states themselves would appear to require a distinction between
Communist conspirators and those advocates of forcible overthrow
whose organization and purposes are confined within the bounds
of a particular locality or state. The judicial premise, evident particularly in Gilbert v. Commonwealth, seems to be that the source
and nature of the Communist conspiracy effectively foreclose the
possibility of Communist-ispired acts of sedition against an individual state as such. Whatever acts might be committed against a
state would in this view be inextricably bound up with a far larger
pattern of the planned overthrow of the federal government. Moreover, the real thrust of the federal lavs which have produced
supersedure is directed at the Communist Party and its adherents
in the United States.'3 2- An indictment brought against a party
member is very likely to allege acts similar to those charged under
129. 134 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Mass. 1956).
130. 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956).
131. Id. at 844. And see Kahn v. Wyman, 123 A.2d 166 (N.H. 1956),
holding that the Nelson case does not preclude legislative investigations
pursuant to a state subversive activities law, as distinguished from criminal
prosecutions.
132. These laws were for the most part so intended, and have unquestionably been so used. See the summary of Department of Justice activity in
note 107 supra.

195-/]

STATE CONTROL OF SEDITION

the sedition laws of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Kentucky,
and for the reasons set forth in those cases, it would appear equally
likely that such an indictment would now be dismissed.
At the same time state laws may, in theory at least, continue
to have validity when applied to the isolated zealot or fanatical
group which seeks Utopia through the seizure of local government,
and advocates forcible means to this end. But such an area is clearly
so narrow as to be of dubious value to the states, since the private
putsch, the planned assassination of state officers, the direct incitement to violence or riot, are all so obviously punishable under other
provisions of state law that sedition acts would appear superfluous.
What the states have wished to do is to join with the federal government in the prosecution of Communists under their own laws.
Absent legislative change, the best estimate today is that they
cannot do so.
VIII
The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding that
by the passage of the Smith Act Congress intended to pre-empt the
field of sedition against the United States produced an immediate
and disapproving reaction on the part of the author of that federal
law. Writing to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania in protest
against the decision, Congressman Howard W. Smith stated that:
" ...As I am the author of the Federal act in question, known
as the Smith Act, I am deeply disturbed by the implications of
this decision. May I say that when I read this opinion, it was
the first intimation I have ever had, either in the preparation of
the act, in the hearings before the Judiciary Committee, in the
debates in the House, or in any subsequent development, that
Congress ever had the faintest notion of nullifying the concurrent jurisdiction of the respective sovereign states to pursue
also their own prosecutions for subversive activities. .
The
whole tenor and purpose of the Smith Act was to eliminate
subversive activities, and not to assist them, which latter might
well be the3 effect of the decision in the Commonwealth v. Nelson case."' 3
Congressman Smith promptly moved to repair, by legislation, the
damage which in his view had been wrought by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. He prepared a bill specifically intended to reverse
the result that court had reached. In its original form the bill, later
known as H.R. 3, was drawn so as to apply very broadly to all
areas of legislative concern. The decision to go beyond mere
133. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 52,89-90, 104 A2d 133. 148-49

(1954) (introduced into the dissenting opinion).
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amendment of the Smith Act, and beyond a bill which would apply
only to sedition and subversive activities, was taken because
Representative Smith believed that the Pennsylvania decision was
"merely a symptom of a dangerous disease that threatened to destroy completely the sovereignty of the states.
I decided to offer
a separate bill to seek a cure of the whole malady ,13'
H.R. 3 was first introduced into the House at the second session of the Eighty-Third Congress (as H.R. 8211)"'3 and was reintroduced at the beginning of the first session of the EightyFourth.1 38 Shortly thereafter, Senator Jenner introduced the coinpanion bill, S.373, into the Senate. 37 These bills provided
"That no Act of Congress shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which such
Act operates, to the exclusion of all State laws on the same
subject matter, unless such Act contains an express provision
to that effect. No Act of Congress shall be construed as invalidating a provision of State law which would be valid in the
absence of such Act unless there is a direct and positive conflict between an express provision of such Act and such provision of State law so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together."
Broadly speaking, this legislation was designed to strengthen the
position of Congress, and correspondingly to reduce that of the
Supreme Court, as arbiter of the federal system within the wide
area where the Constitution permits power to be exercised concurrently by state and federal governments. It was also frankly
intended to halt what Congressman Smith regarded as the increasing and unwarranted usurpation by the federal government of
powers rightfully belonging to the states, and to eliminate uncertainties in the interpretation of Congressional intent.1 3 8 Its sponsors
recognized, however, that Congress could not vest in the states
134. Extension of Remarks in the House of Representatives, 101 Coug.
Rec. 123
135.
136.
137
138.
ings on
follows:

(1955).
100 Cong. Rec. 2614 (1954)
101 Cong. Rec. 31 (1955)
101 Cong. Rec. 333 (1955)
In a brief filed with the subcommittee which was conducting hearH.R. 3, Representative Smith stated the purposes of the bill as
"It would return to Congress, rather than the courts, the authority to
prescribe the extent to which Federal enactments would supersede State
laws on the same subject matter. It would also obviate much of the unpredictability that both the Federal and State government labor under in
attempting to ascertain the proper scope of their respective powers. At
the same time, it would establish a reliable safeguard against the continued diminution of State power."
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the
Judiciarv, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, pt. 1, at 44 (1955).
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powers which the Constitution assigns exclusively to the federal
government, and they expressly disavowed any purpose to do so. An
effort was made also to avoid infringing upon the Constitution's
supremacy clause, it being correctly viewed as a constitutional
necessity to provide that federal law should have precedence in
cases of "direct and positive conflict." 139 The bills were directed
rather at Supreme Court pre-emption doctrine, frequently referred to in the congressional hearings as "supersession by implication." Consequently while some doubts as to constitutionality
were expressed, there is little reason to suppose that the Constitution would prevent Congress from setting out a general rule of
statutory interpretatiorf applicable in those areas where it can normally exclude or include state power by express provision in particular statutes.
The bills introduced by Congressman Smith were referred to a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, EightyFourth Congress, which held hearings during both legislative sessions, first in 1955 and again in April of 1956, a few days after the
United States Supreme Court affirmed in the Nelson case."40 These
hearings disclosed widespread and enthusiastic support for the
141
proposed legislation on the part of state law enforcement officers,
the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Association of
Manufacturers, and individual congressmen. But opposition was
expressed on behalf of the AFL-CIO, the Railway Labor Executives' Association, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, the Department of Justice, and the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The arguments of this latter group were
directly chiefly against H.R. 3's broad applicability, there being
relatively little objection to confirming, in the states, concurrent
power with respect to sedition alone. And it became increasingly
obvious that the bills as introduced raised fundamental political
issues, specifically the sensitive question of whose law is to govern
labor-management relations and of course the broad problem of
states' rights in general. Supporters of the legislation tended
strongly to be those who favor a realignment of powers in favor
of the states, especially in the fields of commerce and labor-man139. The phraseology was consciously adapted from the leading early
case of Sinnott v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1859).

140. Hearings, supra note 138; Hearings before Subcommifltee No. I
of the Howe Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9, pt. 2

(1956).
141. The vote at the 1956 meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General in support of the bills was 31 to 10. N.Y. Times, June 1,
1956, p. 48, col. 4.
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agement relations, while opponents typically represented groups
which have found the exercise of federal power more congenial
than control by state legislatures. Federal agencies were perhaps
less politically motivated, but equally concerned with the impact
which H.R. 3 might be expected to have upon vast areas of federal
regulatory activity It was uncertainty as to the nature of this impact which provided the principal argument against H.R. 3, and
the point was pressed effectively by spokesmen for economic interest groups and by federal officials. The Department of Justice
foresaw enormous problems both in the drafting of future legislation and in redetermining the extent of state power in areas presently under federal regulation. It recommended that
"1
it would be more effective to amend each such law
specifically to eliminate the possibility of conflict with State
statu[t]es rather than by the enactment of blanket legislation,
to throw into doubt operations
in many areas to an extent
42
presently unpredictable.'
The strength and persuasiveness of the opposition to the original H.R. 3 soon produced several substitute bills which were in
terms limited to sedition and subversive activity 143 Among these
was H.R. 11341, which adopted the very different approach of
amending Title 18 of the United States Code to authorize the enforcement of state statutes dealing with sedition against the state
or the United States. This bill did not purport to be a legislative
guide to the interpretation of statutes, although in its limited area
it manifested congressional intent clearly enough. The Judiciary
Committee put the new bill into the form of an amendment to
H.R. 3, and as thus amended, well beyond any recognition, H.R. 3
was reported favorably out of the Committee on July 3, 1956. As
submitted to the House it stated
"Except to the extent specifically provided by any statute hereafter enacted by the Congress, the enactment of (a) any provision of law contained in this chapter or in chapter 37, 67, or
105 of this title, (b) the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, (c) the Communist Control Act of 1954, or (d) any
other Act of Congress heretofore or hereafter enacted which
prescribes any criminal penalty for any act of subversion or
sedition against the Government of the United States or any
142. Letter from William P Rogers, Deputy Attorney General. to
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, June
27, 1955, in Hearings Before Subcommittee No. I of the House Comnmittee
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9, pt. 2, at 141 (1956)
143. H.R. 10335 and H.R. 10344, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) These
are described by their sponsors in 1956 Hearings, supra note 140 at 98-100,
109-12.

19571

STATE CONTROL OF SEDITION

State of the United States, shall not prevent the enforcement in
the courts of any State of any statute of such State prescribing
any criminal penalty for any act, attempt, or conspiracy to commit sedition against such State or the United States, or to overthrow the Government of such State or the Government of the
United States..

,,144

The original objections of the Department of Justice were withdrawn, and the Department favored enactment of the legislation, on
the basis that "in the fields of sedition and subversion, the Federal
and State Governments can work together easily and well...."I"
This view accords with the position the Department had taken in the
amicus brief it submitted to the Supreme Court in the Nelson case.
A companion Senate bill, S.3617, was reported out of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on June 5, 1956.140
With the wisdom of a policy allowing the states to proceed in
these areas we are not here concerned.117 A minority report opposing passage of H.R. 3 was signed by Congressman Celler, and the
144. H.R. Rep. No. 2576, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).

145. Letter from William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, to
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, May 25,
1956, in id. at 5.
146. S. Rep. No. 2117, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). Thls bill was
identical to H.R. 3 with the important exception that it omitted H.R. 3's
opening clause, "Except to the extent specifically provided by any statute
hereafter enacted by the Congress. . ." The purpose of such omission
would appear to have been to make it more difficult for a future Congress to
exclude state power, since it would probably be necessary not only to negate
state power by express provision but also to amend this new section of Title
18. While a Congress willing to take the first step would presumably agree
also as to the second, this sort of restriction upon the freedom of future
legislative action does not seem well-advised.
147. The record in the Nelson case indicates, however, that state power
to ferret out and to prosecute Communists and other persons deemed to be
subversive is susceptible of very serious abuse. As both the Pennsylvania and
United States Supreme Courts explicitly recognized, Nelson's indictment and
trial raised a number of grave constitutional questions, both as to procedure
and as to substance. Chief Justice Warren further commented generally on
the absence from some state sedition laws of accepted constitutional safeguards. 350 U.S. 497, 508 (1956). A succeeding Attorney General of Pennsylvania, moreover, while not necessarily endorsing these constitutional
doubts, has since expressed himself as opposing prosecutions by the states
under their own sedition laws. Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), July 21,
1956, p. 2, col. 8. Even more broadly instructive in this regard is the brief
filed by Frank J. Donner on behalf of individuals who had been either
indicted or interrogated under the sedition laws of Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Kentucky and Florida. See note 17 .rupra. The deeply disturbing facts recited in that brief amply support the writer's conclusions that
the proceedings in the four states therein described were largely motivated
by personal and partisan considerations, and that all were marked by repeated invasions of procedural due process and a parallel disregard for
freedoms of expression. Brief of Frank J. Donner for individual Amici
Curiae, pp. 34-35, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). If state
power in the area of sedition and subversion is to be given congressional
sanction, it should not be on the basis of the record which certain of the states
have thus far made for themselves.
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outlines of a convincing case against concurrent state power over
sedition are suggested there.148 For reasons similarly beyond the
scope of a study of the legal effect of these bills, they were not
brought to a vote during the final session of the Eighty-Fourth
Congress. Since there is cause to believe that they will be reintroduced at the first session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress, a few brief
observations may be in order.
First, H.R. 3 and S. 3617 are infinitely better than their predecessors, which would unquestionably have introduced new uncertainties into an area of law which stands already in great need of
clarification. They represent an approach not radically different
from the amendment of existing and future federal anti-subversive
laws on an individual basis. If enacted into law, they will constitute
a clear statement of congressional intent respecting state power
which is long overdue in this area. Second, they permit the exercise of state power not only in cases of sedition against the states
as such, but against the United States as well, although they do
not appear to comprehend advocacy of the overthrow of local
political subdivisions, nor do they provide any sure guide in determining the validity of related state laws requiring the registration
of Communists or making membership in the Communist Party a
crime. 149 Finally, unless the Supreme Court should show some newfound disposition to treat federal power over sedition as constitutionally exclusive, 150 they would doubtless be effective in their
primary purpose to upset the decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson.
Since that decision clearly turned upon what the Court believed to
be congressional intent, the Court should be properly receptive to
an express indication of what it had been obliged to find by inference. In the event of a direct and irreconcilable conflict between
the provisions of state and federal law, however, courts will continue to invalidate state legislation, since the Constitution's command that the federal law is supreme must be given precedence
over the word of Congress. It is not unlikely that the Supreme
Court might one day have to choose between the two.
148. H.R. Rep. No. 2576, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-17 (1956).
149. If approved by Congress, however, they would likely be offered as
evidence of congressional intent respecting state legislation not strictly within their terms.
150. See note 49 supra.
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